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Executive summary 
The recent financial crisis resulted in an increased attention on the risks of banks and their 
financial instruments. This article discusses the outcomes of a study on the quantity and 
quality of market, credit, and liquidity risk disclosures and the relationship 1) between the 
quantity and quality of disclosures, 2) between disclosures and bank size, 3) disclosures 
and bank profitability, and 4) disclosures and time. The 2005-2008 annual reports of a 
sample of German banks are studied and the disclosures are measured by using two 
disclosure index frameworks. The results provide a sound basis for future research like 
capital market research, event studies, and behavioral studies in relation to risk 
disclosures.  
 
For the full text of this master thesis refer to the following webpage: 
http://hdl.handle.net/2105/5413. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
‘Banks are especially unpopular in two circumstances: first, when they are very 
profitable; and second, when they are very unprofitable (Sir Davies, LSE2). 
 
In 2007, and even more in 2008, the world got confronted with an international financial 
crisis, also called the credit crisis. One of the industries that is hit hard by this crisis is the 
German banking industry, that even needed support from the government to survive. 
 
Since the existence of banks these are known to be major risk taking and risk management 
entities. According to Linsley and Shrives (2005, 205) they are therefore “expected to 
release relevant risk-related information to the marketplace, as part of good corporate 
governance”. The annual report is for many years used to communicate firm performance 
with share- and stakeholders and includes, in general, both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. Although some suggest that companies will disclose more bad news when their 
financial position is threatened (Darrough and Stoughton, 1999; Suijs, 2005), Linsley and 
                                             
1 Laura van Oorschot studied ‘Business Economics’ at the Erasmus University Rotterdam and is currently 
employed by KPMG Accountants N.V. This article is based on the Master thesis, which was supervised by 
Drs. J. Maat.  
2 Sir Howard Davies, director of the London School of Economics in ‘New banking rules: tread carefully’, The 
Financial Times, September 30, 2008.  
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Shrives (2006, 279) state that banks might wish to keep discussion about their risk levels 
out of the public domain.  
 
The discussion about risk disclosures was already going on for several years due to major 
corporate scandals, but it took the International Accounting Standards Board however until 
2005 to publish an exposure draft to come to regulation to improve the disclosures about 
financial instruments and their risks. From 2007 specific disclosures are required by IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments – Disclosures. Other risk disclosures are required by Basel II pillar 3 
(2008) and for German banks already since 1998 by the Commercial Code and since 2001 by 
the German Accounting Standard 5-10. Comprehensive risk disclosures in the annual 
reports of German banks are therefore expected, even in the years before IFRS 7 and Basel 
II.  
 
Since there are only a few empirical studies on risk disclosures by banks (Basel Committee, 
2001, 2002, 2003; Linsley et al., 2006; Helbok and Wagner, 2006) and the interest in it has 
strongly increased recently, it is interesting and relevant to examine this topic. This study 
focuses on a recent time period and incorporates as one of the first the disclosure 
requirements of IFRS 7. Next to that, a different way of measuring the quality of 
information is developed, as opposed to other studies that use the quantity as a proxy for 
the quality of information.  
 
The problem of this research is defined by the following main research question: 
 
How can differences in the quantity and quality of financial instrument risk disclosures in 
the annual reports of German banks be measured and explained? 
 
In conclusion, this article discusses research on the risk disclosures of financial instruments 
in the annual reports of German banks and analyzes some factors that might be of 
influence on the differences in disclosures over time and between banks. In section 2 some 
information on the background of risk and disclosures is provided, together with the 
discussion of prior literature. Section 3 hereafter provides information on the disclosure 
frameworks used, the developed hypotheses and the way the results are calculated. In 
section 4 the results and analysis are discussed and section 5 includes the limitations of 
this study and the conclusion.  
 
 
2. Background and prior literature 
 
2.1. Background risk and risk disclosures 
Risk is driven by internal and external factors, and both the ASB and ICAEW view risk as the 
“uncertainty as to the amount of benefits” which “includes both potential for gain and 
exposure to loss” (ICAEW, 1998, 5). According to Beretta and Bozzolan (2004, 269) risk 
disclosures can as a consequence of this definition be defined as “the communication of 
factors that have the potential to affect expected results”.  
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Since this research focuses on risk disclosures of financial instruments it is useful to make 
clear what financial instruments are. According to the International Accounting Standards 
this is “any contract that gives rise to a financial assets of one entity and a financial 
liability or equity instrument of another entity” (IAS 32.11) and can be divided into 
primary (receivables, payables, and equity instruments) and derivative financial 
instruments (options, futures, forwards, and swaps). Although the goal of having financial 
instrument is to make a profit on them or prevent losses with it, there is always some 
uncertainty about whether this goal will be achieved. This uncertainty can be divided in 
three main categories: credit risk, liquidity risk, and market risk whereby the latter 
includes currency risk, interest rate risk, and other price risk. 
 
The rationale behind risk reporting can be explained by the agency theory, the information 
asymmetry perspective, the information risk perspective, the Modern Portfolio Theory, the 
political cost perspective and the signalling perspective. Due to their position the 
information that banks and the users of their annual reports have differs. Disclosing part of 
this information will reduce the information asymmetry between the parties and might 
result in reduced costs of capital, better decision making by shareholders, less attention 
from supervisors like the Authority of Financial Markets (AFM) or central banks and the 
prevention of reputation damage. Managers might however be reluctant to release risk 
information since this might be commercially sensitive and can give competitors an 
advantage. Second, there is the issue of forward-looking information which is according to 
the ICAEW “unreliable and could leave directors open to potential claims from investors 
who have acted upon this information” (Linsley et al. 2006, 269).  
 
Although risks in business have always existed, major corporate scandals in the past 30 
years, the increasing complexity of business structures, a changing environment and 
technology, and the current crisis on the financial markets have increased the focus on risk 
and risk management. In the past years different reports gave considerable attention to 
this topic (Cadbury Report, 1992; AICPA, 1995; ICAEW, 1998; Turnbull Report, 1999; 
ICAEW, 1999; ICAEW, 2002) and the disclosures of risks have become less voluntary.  
 
When it comes to comprehensive risk reporting, Germany was a forerunner by introducing 
the Law on Corporate Control and Transparency in 1998. This resulted in amendments of 
paragraphs 289 (1) and 315 (1) of the German Commercial Code, which required companies 
to report in their annual reports about risks, chances and expected future developments, 
including the assumptions for this (HGB § 289 (1) and § 315 (1)). Later on, in 2001, the 
German Accounting Standard Board adopted German Accounting Standard No.5. Risk 
reporting, with GAS 5-10 about risk reporting by banks. Another few years later the 
International Accounting Standards Board revised and enhanced the already existing 
regulation regarding the disclosures of financial instruments (IAS 32) due to the fact that 
“the techniques used by entities for measuring and managing exposure to risks arising 
from financial instruments have evolved and new risk management concepts and 
approaches have gained acceptance” (IASB, 2004, 3). From 2007 companies with financial 
instruments and that report in conformity with IFRS have to comply with IFRS 7, which 
requires specific risk disclosures in the annual report. For banks the requirements of Basel 
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II pillar 3 are added to this since 2008, although a part of these requirements are similar to 
those in IFRS 7. If incorporated into national laws, companies in the EU member states 
already had to report on risks and uncertainties however since 2005, due to a change in 
article 1(14)(a)3. This resulted in similar requirements by the EU as the requirements in the 
German Commercial Code since 1998. 
 
2.2. Prior risk disclosure literature 
The past 30 years many researchers have examined voluntary disclosures in annual reports 
from different perspectives, including the capital market and positive accounting 
perspective. Recent studies focus more specifically on the topic of risk reporting in annual 
reports (e.g. Kajüter and Winkler, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007).  
 
Most of the research on risk disclosures focuses on non-financial companies in a particular 
country and examine among others the relationship between the level of risk disclosures 
and company size. For instance Linsley and Shrives (2006) who found, in according to a 
study by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), that for a sample of 79 UK FTSE 100 listed firms 
there exists a positive relationship between the amount of risk disclosures and company 
size4.  
 
A more specific stream of risk disclosure studies focuses on risk disclosures in relation to 
derivatives and other financial instruments by financial and non-financial companies 
(Adedji and Baker, 1999; Rajgopal, 1999; Jorion, 2002; Dunne et al., 2004). Dunne et al. 
(2004) and Dunne and Helliar (2003) thereby found that the implementation of FRS 13 
Derivatives and Other Financial Instruments – Disclosures resulted in an increase in 
disclosures, but also a market reaction. 
 
Studies on risk reporting by German, mostly non-financial firms are performed by Kajüter 
and Winkler (2003), Fischer and Vielmeyer (2004) and Kajüter and Esser (2007). For 
example, by examining the management reports of a sample of 83 German stock-listed 
companies and using content analysis, Kajüter and Winkler (2003, 219-228) found that the 
quantity of risk disclosures increased in the period 1999-2001, but that there was non-
compliance with GAS 5 which became effective in 2001. 
Literature on risk reporting by banks is still rather rare due to the limited amount of 
research on this topic. The literature that is available can be divided in two different 
streams: ‘academic’ research (Basel Committee, 1999, 2000, 2001; Linsley et al., 2006; 
Helbok and Wagner, 2000) and research by audit firms (e.g. PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2008; Ernst & Young, 2008; KPMG, 2008).  
                                             
3 Modernisation Directive 2003/51/EC of June 18th, 2003 
4 Company size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of market value and the natural logarithm of 
turnover. The Pearson correlation for market value is 0.467 and for turnover 0.364, both significant at a 
0.01 level.  
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The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was the first to study this specific topic by 
analyzing the disclosure levels in the 1999, 2000 and 2001 annual reports of approximately 
55 different banks from 13 countries all over the world. The finding were based on a 
survey of 104 questions in 12 categories about different types of risk in the annual reports 
and were filled in by the national banking supervisors with yes, no or not applicable. 
Conclusion by the Basel Committee were based on the comparison of disclosure rated 
during the years. For the year 2000 for instance they concluded that the internal models 
for market risk are rather extensively disclosed, but that the disclosures of the results of 
stress tests should be improved (Basel Committee, 2002, 7).  
 
Linsley et al. (2006) conducted one of the first studies using content-analysis by counting 
sentences in the 2002 annual reports of a sample of in total 18 British and Canadian banks, 
divided into two groups of 9 banks selected from the database The Banker. By conducting 
this research they examined whether the size, profitability, risk level, and quantity of risk 
definitions of the bank have a positive relationship with the total quantity of disclosure 
levels (Linsley et al., 2006, 274). Hereby they made use of the disclosure model as used by 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Kajüter (2001).  
 
In accordance with the studies by Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) of non-financial companies, Linsley et al. (2006) also found a positive relationship 
between bank size, as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets and the natural 
logarithm of market capitalization, and the total quantity of risk disclosures of banks5. No 
association was found between the amount of risk disclosures and bank profitability, and 
the amount of risk disclosures and risk level. Although there was not found a statistically 
different level of risk disclosures between Canadian and UK banks, further research is 
useful before more general statements about risk disclosures by banks can be made. 
 
Apart for the academic studies, audit firms also study the topic of risk reporting and IFRS 
7. For instance KPMG (2008) examined a sample of 25 European bank and 14 insurance 
companies and their 2007 annual reports by using a disclosure index framework. This 
framework consists of 6 types of risk and in total 160 items, which are based on regulatory 
requirements, recommendations, emerging ideas, and best practices (KPMG, 2008, 12). 
One of their results is that credit risk turns out to be the risk area in which disclosures are 
the most developed and another result is that requirements by regulation are in general 
less developed that the best practices by banks.   
 
 
3. Hypotheses development and research design 
 
3.1. Risk disclosure frameworks 
The objective of this research is to examine the risk disclosures of banks and to analyze 
the possible differences is disclosures. In many prior research this is done by using content 
                                             
5 The results show a Pearson-correlation of 0.734 and significance of 0.001 for total assets, and a Pearson-
correlation of 0.615 and significance of 0.015 for market capitalization. For total assets the correlation is 
significant at the 0.01 level and for market capitalization at the 0.05 level (Linsley et al., 2006, 279) 
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analysis (e.g. Kajüter and Winkler, 2003; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2006, Linsley et al., 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007; Amran et al., 2009). This is according 
to Babbie (2007, 319) “the study of recorded human communication” and can be classified 
as unobtrusive research in which social behaviour is studied but not affected.  
One of the approaches of content analysis is the disclosure index study “that specifies ex 
ante a list of items and scrutinise the text for presence, ignoring sections of the text that 
do not relate to this list” (Beattie et al., 2004, 208). For this study this research method is 
used.  
 
In order to measure both the quantity and quality of risk disclosures, two disclosures 
frameworks are developed. One to measure the quantity of disclosures and one to measure 
the quality of disclosures. Since other research does not make use of comparable 
frameworks, for instance Linsley et al. (2006) count the sentences in the annual reports 
about specific risks, new indexes are constructed. The items included in the quantity 
framework are based on IFRS 7.31-42 , which correspond to the requirements of Basel II 
pillar 3 and the German Commercial Code. The items in the quality framework are based 
on the qualitative characteristics of information6 as defined by the conceptual frameworks 
of the IASB (2001) and The Basel Committee (1998). The two frameworks are included in 
appendix A and appendix B.  
 
The frameworks are cross-country and in different industries applicable since they are 
based on worldwide adopted accounting standards and characteristics of information. For 
banks the risk disclosures are however much more important and therefore expected to be 
more comprehensive. In this study the frameworks are not intended to be used as a 
compliance study and no statements about whether a particular bank complies with the 
regulation will be made. The focus will be on a single industry and a single country. More 
research is therefore necessary to examine the differences between industries and 
countries. 
 
For every disclosed item an annual report can score one point. Based on the number of 
items in the framework that are applicable to the annual report of a bank a maximum 
amount of points can be scored7. The quantity and quality of disclosures can be measured 
by calculating a score for every annual report according to the following formula: 
 
 
 
By dividing the sum of the scores of all items of bank B by the maximum score of bank B, 
the result will be a disclosure score between 0 and 1. If for example the number of items 
in the framework is 30 and the maximum score as well, and in the annual report 25 items 
                                             
6 Relevance, comparability, reliability and understandability.  
7 The maximum score for an annual report can differ since not all the items in the frameworks have to be 
relevant for every bank and every year. Therefore not all the items should always be taken into account.  
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are disclosed, the disclosure score is 25/30 = 0,833. After calculating all the scores these 
can be compared with each other since the scores are scaled.  
 
3.2. Sample size and selection of years 
The sample of this study consists of 32 annual reports of the period 2005-2008 of the 8 
German banks as included in table 1. The rationale behind selecting those years is due to 
the fact that from January 1, 2007 the requirements of IFRS 7 are mandatory. Two years 
before and two years after the introduction are therefore selected since an increase in 
disclosures is expected to be shown in the annual reports.  
 
Table 1 Banks included in sample 
 
Commerzbank* Hypovereinsbank 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale  KfW Bankengruppe 
Deutsche Bank* LandesBank Berlin Holding* 
Deutsche Postbank* WestLB 
* stock-listed in Germany and/or abroad 
 
 
3.3.Hypotheses 
A limited amount of hypotheses is developed in order to find explanations for possible 
differences in disclosure scores. These hypotheses will be described in short below. 
 
Quantity versus quality 
Since researchers and their studies do not agree on whether quantity is a good proxy for 
quality, two disclosure frameworks are developed to measure both quantity and quality 
aside from each other. Since there is no clear theoretical background for the expectation 
that banks that disclose a lot of information also provide qualitative better information the 
following hypothesis is drawn up: 
 
H1: Banks with high quantity scores do not have high scores on the quality items. 
 
Risk disclosures and bank size 
In general, larger companies attract more attention from share- and stakeholders than 
smaller companies. According to the Political Cost Theory this might lead to higher 
political costs and one way of reducing these costs is to disclose more information. Also 
the problems of information asymmetry, agency costs and higher demand of returns for 
shareholders will be higher for larger companies. In accordance with Diamond and 
Verrechia (1991,1325) larger companies and banks are therefore expected to disclose more 
risk information. The following hypothesis is based on this: 
 
H2a: There is a significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2005-2006. 
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Since the disclosure requirements are equal for all banks in the period 2007-2008 the 
following hypothesis is drawn up for this period: 
 
H2b: There is no significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2007-2008. 
 
Larger banks are expected to produce qualitative better annual reports since they have 
more political exposure and in general more stakeholders that make use of the annual 
reports. The following hypotheses are therefore drawn up: 
 
H2c: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2005-2006. 
 
H2d: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and bank size in the period 
2007-2008. 
 
Risk disclosures and profitability 
According to Helbok and Wagner (2006a, 11) banks that are more profitable will be early 
adopters of risk disclosures since they want to distinguish themselves from the other, less 
profitable banks. Next to that, the political cost theory gives rise to the expectation that 
more profitable banks will disclose more risk information, although in general mixed 
results are found8. In accordance with the theory and expectations the following 
hypotheses are drawn up, taking into account that from 2007 the risk disclosures are 
mandatory: 
 
H3a: There is a significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2005-2006. 
 
H3b: There is no significant positive relationship between the quantity of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2007-2008. 
 
H3c: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual reports of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2005-2006. 
 
H3d: There is a significant positive relationship between the quality of risk 
disclosures in the annual report of German banks and the relative profitability of 
the banks in the period 2007-2008. 
 
                                             
8 See Ahmed and Courtis. 1999. Associations between corporate disclosure characteristics and disclosure levels 
in annual reports: A meta-analysis, British Accounting Review 31: 35-61.  
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Risk disclosures and time 
In previous research by Kajüter and Winkler (2003) a positive relationship between the 
quality of risk disclosures in the German annual reports of 1999-2001 of non-financial stock 
listed companies and time was found. This result is consistent with the increase in demand 
of risk disclosures and the general trend that is observed in the disclosures of banks 
(Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 210). Next to that the disclosure scores of the German banks in 
tables 2 and 3 also show at first sight an increase in the quantity and quality of disclosures 
and therefore the following hypotheses are drawn up:  
 
H4a: The quantity of risk disclosures in the annual reports of German banks has 
increased significantly between the period 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. 
 
H4b: The quality of risk disclosures in the annual reports of German banks has 
increased significantly in the period 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. 
 
3.4. Variable measurement and statistical methods 
In order to calculate the correlation between bank size, profitability and disclosure scores, 
the measurement of the variables have to be determined. Since not all banks in the sample 
are stock-listed, bank size is not measured by market value of equity but by total assets, 
and in order to prevent heteroscedasticity by taking the natural logarithm of total assets. 
The relative profitability is measured by the financial ratios Return on (Average) Total 
Assets (ROA) and Return on (Average) Equity (ROE). 
 
Due to the normal distribution of the variables (by excluding possible outliers) parametric 
tests can be applied to all the hypotheses. For hypotheses 1-3 Pearson correlation 
coefficients are calculated at a 95 % confidence interval. For the fourth hypotheses a 
paired samples t-test is used. The average disclosure score of the years 2005-2006 and 
2007-2008 for every bank is calculated and these results are pair-wise compared to each 
other.  
 
 
4. Results and analysis 
Applying the disclosure frameworks and statistical analysis as explained in sections 3.1. 
and 3.4. shows the results as presented in tables 2, 3 and 4.   
 
Table 2 Disclosure scores quantity     Table 3 Disclosure scores quality 
 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean 0,62 0,66 0,83 0,87 
Min 0,29 0,41 0,75 0,81 
Max 0,78 0,81 0,95 0,95 
Stand.dev. 0,16 0,13 0,07 0,05 
 
As opposed to the expectation of no significant correlation between the quantity and 
quality the results show a significant positive relationship (at a confidence level of 99%). 
This can be interpreted as banks that disclosure more items based on the quantity 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Mean 0,75 0,78 0,89 0,90 
Min 0,50 0,67 0,85 0,85 
Max 0,92 0,83 1,00 1,00 
Stand.dev. 0,12 0,06 0,07 0,05 
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framework apparently also provide information of higher quality, for instance by disclosing 
information in a specific way (e.g. including graphs and tables, comparable figure of 
previous years). Since most of the banks score high on quality is it possible that banks 
imitate each other.  
No significant positive relationship between the quantity of disclosures and bank size was 
found for the years 2005-2006, which might be explained by the influence of the German 
disclosure requirements of GAS 5-10. Since these disclosures have been mandatory for 
banks for several years before the introduction of IFRS 7 the disclosures of banks have 
apparently become more similar. Institutional isomorphism or the influence of a large, 
dominant bank might be an explanation but cannot be tested with the obtained results. 
The surprising positive relationship in the period 2007-2008 might be explained by the 
influence of the financial crisis on bank sizes. No unambiguous conclusion can be drawn on 
whether the size of a bank is of significant influence on the risk disclosures in annual 
reports.  
 
Table 4 Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
   Quantity 
All 
Quality 
All 
LnTA 
05-06 
LnTA 
07-08 
ROAA 
05-06 
ROAA 
07-08 
ROAE 
05-06 
ROAE 
07-08 
Quantity 
All 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
1 0.820**       
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
 0.000       
 N  32 32       
Quality 
All 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
0.820** 1       
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
0.000        
 N  32 32       
Quantity 
05-06 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
  0.097  0.078  0.231  
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
  0.720  0.773  0.390  
 N    16  16  16  
Quantity 
07-08 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
   0.548*  -0.422  -0.343 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
   0.028  0.117  0.211 
 N     16  15  15 
Quality 
05-06 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
  0.144  0.209  0.305  
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
  0.596  0.437  0.251  
 N    16  16  16  
Quality 
07-08 
Pearson 
Correlation 
 
   0.567*  0.106  0.142 
 Sig. (2-
tailed) 
 
   0.022  0.708  0.613 
 N     16  15  15 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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As explained above, GAS 5-10 might be of influence on the disclosure levels of banks in the 
period 2005-2006. For profitability there is therefore no significant positive relationship 
shown either in the period 2005-2006. The fact that risk information is commercially 
sensitive and involves a lot of uncertainty might also cause larger and more profitable 
banks not to show significantly more risk information. The non-significant negative results 
for the period 2007-2008 should be interpreted with care and in general no strong 
statements about the relationship with profitability can be made based on these results. 
 
The most interesting result is the significant increase in the quantity and quality of 
disclosure between the periods 2005-2006 and 2007-2008. The paired samples t-test shows 
results of -3,757 and -3,603, with significance levels of 0,007 and 0,0009 for quantity and 
quality. This was already expected since the demand for disclosures has increased and due 
to the introduction of IFRS 7. The financial crisis on the other hand might also be of great 
influence since the focus of banks and their risk has increased greatly. By disclosing more 
information banks might want to avoid discussions and prevent reputation damage. Even 
though according to Linsley et al. (2006, 279) banks rather do not discuss their risk levels 
publicly, the introduction of IFRS 7 is expected to be the main driver behind the significant 
increase. Previous research has also shown that accounting standards are of important 
influence on risk disclosures.  
 
 
5. Limitations and conclusion 
Limitations of this research are subjectivity, a limited amount of selected items in the 
frameworks and the lack of scientific evidence that support the items in the quality 
framework. Next to that, due to the limitation of time only a sample of German banks is 
examined which makes it impossible to make statements about the whole (German) 
banking industry.  
 
Based on this research a number of other studies are however possible. For instance 
whether the capital market becomes more efficient and the cost of capital declines due to 
increased risk disclosures. Also a behavioural study can be done to examine whether 
increased risk disclosures will lead to better decision making and judgements of the users 
of the annual reports, and an event study on the introduction of IFRS 7 and the financial 
crisis. In conclusion, this research is relevant for future research since it provides evidence 
about the development of risk disclosures in the banking sector which might be explained 
by a number of other factors and/or have an effect on the decision making of users of the 
annual reports.  
 
In conclusion, this research has mainly showed that the demand and supply of risk 
disclosures has increased over the years. For the German banking sector the presence of 
regulation (GAS 5-10, IFRS 7) is however the expected main driver for the increased supply, 
and not the size and profitability of a bank.  
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